I thought I'd put a story up on my blog about the Exxon Valdez incident and thought I'd post it here for comments before I put it on the Internet where it will be archived by other servers and around forever; for good or ill. Your comments would be appreciated. The Exxon Valdez Incident from a Seaman's Point of View Late in the evening of March 23, 1989 the largest tanker in the U.S. fleet, the Exxon Valdez, departed from its berth at Port Valdez adjacent to Prince William Sound, Alaska bound for the San Francisco Bay area. Although I had worked for Exxon (and am a retired Exxon merchant marine officer) the Exxon Valdez was put into service after I had left the company. I had lightered from the Valdez as an officer aboard a Chevron tanker some few months before the incident and was impressed by the size of the ship. Even laden, the wing of the Valdez' bridge towered over the little Chevron tanker (which herself made regular trips to Alaska). I had worked with every deck officer on the Valdez at the time of the incident including Captain Joe Hazelwood who has been, more than any other person, held responsible for the incident; at least in the media. In legal terms, he was not, however, responsible for the grounding of the tanker on Bligh Reef shortly after midnight on March 24, 1989. About a week after the grounding I was on the bridge of another Chevron tanker along with every other officer as we exited the Valdez Narrows and set a course identical to the one the Exxon Valdez should have been on... but wasn't. We could see the huge tanker surrounded by other vessels including another tanker pumping off what was left of the crude oil cargo. Looking at our course, our radar and GPS readings, and the location of the Exxon Valdez hard on Bligh Reef, we could not imagine how the ship's officer on watch that night could have possibly made such a gigantic mistake. I still don't understand it but I do have some insight into the incident. Like most disasters there was no single decision that was the cause but, rather, a long line of poor decisions made by various members of the cast. Including people who never worked on ships. I just finished watching, on the Green Channel (cable), a documentary (Black Wave) which was probably the single most one-sided story I've ever read. Filled with pathos and drama it blamed Exxon for every part of the disaster except for the parts Captain Joe Hazelwood got blamed for. According to this story there has been nothing but woe for everyone ever since. It ignored reports by NOAA about considerable recovery of the area and blamed the spill for poor fishing despite equally poor fishing almost everywhere. No opposing viewpoints were offered although they claimed that they offered ExxonMobile a chance to speak. I have no love for oil companies and have, over the years, had my own issues with them. But to blame Exxon solely for the oil spill is to ignore some of the other issues. Including the fact that Alyeska, the operators of the Valdez oil terminal, was required by law to have oil containment and recovery equipment in place, manned, and operational. Alyeska had no such equipment ready and Exxon had to undertake the entire cleanup on its own. A clean up which few people understood in an isolated area under hostile conditions. I thought Exxon did better than most soulless corporations would under the circumstances then and I still do now. I sailed many times with Captain Joe Hazelwood and I liked him and enjoyed working with him. He had, so I've heard, his own problems but I never thought he was anything less than a competent seaman. For those of you who commute to work on the freeway just imagine spending 120 days in a situation where you can call home only every two weeks, get no television (or news), and work 12 hours of every day, 7 days a week. Now you get someone who tells you that you can't have a drink on the few days where you can get off to eat dinner somewhere that doesn't rock and roll and you can get some idea of the stupidity of some of the laws. Lest you think that I am the sort of sailor who spent all his time in bars let me hasten to inform you that I seldom drink alcohol and it's a common joke among my friends that I am allowed only three diet colas in an evening. What follows is a short list of events that I feel set the stage for the Exxon Valdez incident followed by some windy stories which are no doubt dull and boring. These are my own opinions and are not official in any sense of the word. I am, after all, an old sailor and, as such, I'm allowed to tell sea stories. But here is the way I see it. First a list and then some explanation of them and how they fit into the story: 1. Pilotage changed from Cape Hinchenbrook on Montague Island to the SW end of the Valdez Narrows. 2. Radar coverage limited to Port Valdez and the Valdez Narrows. 3. Exxon management stops ships from carrying the extra third mate. 4. Alyeska refuses to allow vessels unable to exit Prince William Sound to re-enter Port Valdez even in severe weather; requiring instead that they travel in a holding pattern inside PWS until the weather abates (this means fully laden tankers moving in circles inside PWS). 5. Exxon requires Masters to make full loading report upon the departure of the Pilot (makes sense in places like Houston but not so much in Prince William Sound).. 6. Exxon replaces deck gang with graduates of the Marchant Marine Academies in a money saving action to bust its seamen's union. 7. Alyeska allows the oil spill barge to be demanned and its equipment to deteriorate and/or disappear. Let's take these one at a time. 1. When the Valdez terminal was first operational the harbor pilot would embark (for inbound shipping) and disembark (for outbound shipping) from a pilot boat based at a pilot station located on Montague Island which is the last bit of land prior to entering the Gulf of Alaska in the North Pacific Ocean. This proved untenable as bad weather at the Cape Hinchinbrook (located on Montague Island) often made it impossible for the pilot to get onto ships or off of them. Ships departing Prince William Sound had to carry the pilot all the way to their next port (usually Puget Sound, San Francisco, or Los Angeles but sometimes Hawaii, Anchorage, Homer, Kenai, etc.) and then fly them back to Valdez at the company's expense. This, as you may imagine, was very unpopular with the shipping companies and their accountants so they lobbied the U.S. Coast Guard to make some changes. One of the alternatives was to require all Masters to have pilotage of Prince William Sound. This would entail that all Captains take a certain number of trips on the waters of the Sound under the supervision of a master pilot and then take an examination and have this added to their existing license. It's very common for companies to require pilotage for their home waters but no companies had their home waters in Prince William Sound. Companies objected as this would make it difficult to obtain relief Captains for their ships; especially Union ships. It would, however, ensure that a pilot was on the bridge for the entire trip through Prince William Sound. Another option was to use helicopters to bring the pilot out but inclement weather had an even greater impact on helicopters than it did on pilot boats. The option that was finally selected was to declare that Prince William Sound was non-pilotage waters and establishing inbound and outbound traffic lanes and requiring tankers to carry redundant Collision Avoidance Systems run by the radar systems (CAS) on the bridge of all tankers moving into and out of Port Valdez. This was a crucial change and it resulted in allowing all deck officers, from third mates, the lowest on the rung of bridge officers the license awarded to 21-year-old graduates of the Merchant Marine Academies, to experienced Chief Mates and Captains to be in charge of 50,000 ton tankers moving in Prince William Sound. And the officer of the watch on the Exxon Valdez when the pilot disembared was a third mate. 1. When the pilotage requirement was eliminated at Montague Island it was moved to the outer limits of the Narrows. This is a relatively tight channel about 6 nautical miles long which leads from Prince William Sound into the protected harbor of Port Valdez. The USCG requires tankers to obey strict speed limts to reduce the potential damage should a tanker suddenly lose control in the narrow channel which is subject to tidal currents. The USCG monitors ship movements in the Narrows by means of a radar system which is manned by personnel in Port Valdez. This system is fully capable of presenting imagery of shipping in most of Prince William Sound but, at least very early in the morning of March 24, 1989 it was not set to display ships beyond the pilot station at the outer end of the Narrows. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the operators of the radar system went on break as soon as the pilot had disembarked from the Exxon Valdez even though Captain Hazelwood had requested permission from traffic control to detour out of the lanes to avoid heavy ice in the lanes themselves. This will be a major contributor to the incident. 2. On ships the officer responsible for loading and unloading is the Chief Mate who is second in command next to the Captain. On a tanker taking on cargo at Port Valdez the Chief Mate is generally up and on watch for the entire period of time the ship is loading cargo plus time to calculate the amount of cargo taken aboard. This is a highly technical job on a supertanker and the Ch. Mate must be careful to arrange the load to go into the cargo tanks while ensuring that the ship stays balanced and that the hull does not break in two from uneven loading. The other officers (Second Mate and Third Mate) assist as necessary on their watches. The Captain is generally only in overall supervision of the process and leaves this to his Ch. Mate. Often, in fact, the Captain leaves the ship to conduct business or even take meals ashore. It is commonly felt that this bolsters the image of the Ch. Mate as a potential Captain among the crew. Captain Hazelwood, regardless of whatever faults he may have had, was considered to be a Captain who allowed his officers to make decisions without heavy-handed supervision. Most of us enjoyed working with him and this was partly due to his management technique and partly due to his personality. However these loading chores did reduce the effectiveness of the Chief Mate as he resumed his duties once the ship was laden and ready for sea; especially if his bridge watch came just as the ship was ready to sail after being up 24 to 36 hours supervising the loading of the ship. The quick turn-around of modern tankers combined with the relatively fast speeds and short distances sailed by the Valdez tankers was a factor in having most tankers carry an extra third mate; a licensed officer paid at third mate wages who helped in the loading of the ships and stood the Ch. Mate's watch (12 to 4, both am and pm) upon departure. This reduced the workload of the Chief Mate considerably and added to the safety of the ship at sea by having one more licensed deck officer. The problem for Exxon Shipping was that new managers limited avenues available to reduce expenses and increase profits and apparent efficiency. So many of the costs were, after all, fixed. One manager noticed the extra third mate and decided that (s)he could look pretty efficient on the bottom line by simply eliminating this position. And so it was done. On the Exxon Valdez the night of March 23, 1989 the ship sailed from the terminal during the Chief Mate's watch but as he had been up the entire time the regular third mate took his watch and the Ch. Mate got to go below and get some sleep. But the third mate had also been up working during the loading cycle and one can presume that he, too, was tired. So another link in the chain of the Exxon Valdez incident was forged. 3. Weather in Alaska can be severe almost any time however modern ships are capable of handling most weather conditions and ship masters often pride themselves on not letting bad weather interfere with the sailing of their ships. Add to this the policy of Alyeska (the operators of the Valdez oil terminal) to refuse to allow laden tankers to re-enter Port Valdez once they had left. This policy was no doubt formed to reduce any chances of a laden tanker coming to grief in the Narrows; which were long considered to be the most dangerous portion of the entry to Port Valdez. The result was that any Captain who felt that the weather outside the relatively protected waters of Prince William Sound was too severe to allow the ship to depart could not simply return to port but had to motor around Prince William Sound until the weather abated. If another tanker could not depart then there would be two tankers motoring around Prince William Sound. If yet another tanker.... well, you get the idea. It could probably be argued that tankers motoring around Prince William Sound in the teeth of a full Alaskan storm might not be that great an idea. This policy was scrapped upon the grounding of the Exxon Valdez and less than a month later I was on a tanker which was first in a string of tankers trying to get past Cape Hinchinbrook and which was subsequently allowed to return to Port Valdez and tie up for 24 hours. This particular policy was not a directo factor in the Exxon Valdez incident but it weighed heavily on the mids of every officer on the ship. We knew that loss of the plant (the engine) could spell disaster if it occurred inside Prince William Sound. 4. Despite the simple fact that practically no one was working at the headquarters of Exxon Shipping in Houston, Texas after quitting time, the policy was that all Captains had to make a full departure and loading report and transmit it by teletype over the satellite link as soon as the pilot disembarked. Joe Hazelwood has been castigated for retiring to his cabin and leaving a relatively inexperienced third mate in charge on the bridge of the larges ship in the Exxon fleet while he got drunk one deck below. No one will know whether Captain Hazelwood was drunk or not. The officers who boarded the ship after the grounding claimed that they could smell alcohol on the Captain's breath but that testimony is compromised by the statements of everyone else on the ship who testified that the aroma of the volatile elements of crude oil in the air made it difficult to breathe let alone determine whether someone had alcohol on his or her breath. Hazelwood had a reputation, there is no doubt about it, but whether or not he had been drinking in his cabin (or even before the incident) is immaterial. Captain Hazelwood was not on the bridge because he had to prepare the loading and departure reports per Exxon's company policy. Remember that the waters of Prince William Sound had been declared by the USCG to be a non-pilotage area meaning that any properly licensed deck officer is qualified to be in charge of the operation of the vessel. On March 24, 2009 the third mate was an experienced seaman who had risen through the ranks from a seaman to an officer and who had served as third mate for Exxon Shipping for several years. According to the USCG Captain Hazelwood was justified under the law to leave the thrid mate in charge of the ship while he went below to prepare the loading and departure reports headquarters in Houston demanded that he prepare; whether anyone would read them before morning or not. 5. Now recall that the managers at Exxon Shipping found that if they wanted to improve upon the performance of their predecessors and gain a promotion they were at a severe disadvantage. The crew of a ship the size of the Exxon Valdez was set by USCG rules: A Captain (1), a Radio Officer (1) (no longer required), three deck officers (3), a Chief Engineer (1), three engineering officers (3); Able Bodied Seamen with blue water endorsements (deep sea experience) (4), Oilers (4), Stewards and cooks. A smaller ship built in the 1950s would have typically carried around 50 officers and crew. The Exxon Valdez carried about 22 people. So previous managers of various shipping companies had pretty much reduced the manpower to minimum; no fat to cut there. Can't cut back on victuals as those, too, were mandated by USCG rules (the USCG, you see, had dealt with shipping managers in the past and knew what they might do to get that next promotion). The engine on a ship uses less fuel if you move slower but then the refineries bitch so you can't cut back on fuel costs. This leaves reducing maintenance costs and lots of managers have cut expenses there; trust me. Not much fat left in the system, it would appear. Appearances would be deceiving. The managers at Exxon Shipping always knew that new graduates of the country's merchant marine academies carried a brand new third mate's license but they discovered that they also carried a blue water able-bodied seaman's card. And with the poor state of the United States merchant marine there were more of these looking for jobs on ships than there were jobs on ships. The deck crew of Exxon Shipping had formed their own company union which was in negotiations with management when management hired crew members from the merchant marine academies. An end-run around the union. The only drawback to this plan was that while the old deck crew were grizzled veterans of many years of voyaging under their... uh... keels, the new people were around 22 years old with 4 years of college under their belts. If you think that there is no difference between holders of A/B bluewater cards you would be, in my humble opinion, mistaken. The graduates had indeed served on academy ships as deck crew so it wasn't as if they had no experience. But they didn't much want to be deck crew. They all wanted to be deck officers. And what's more, that's what they went to school for. So the late on the night of March 23, 1989 the Exxon Valdez sailed from Port Valdez with lookouts made up of new crew who very likely had never made this passage before; or certainly not very often, and could not be expected to recognize where the navigational markers should be as opposed to where they were.. Would this impact the grounding of the ship on Bligh Reef? We'll never know, will we? 6. When the Valdez oil terminal was first constructed there was considerable thought given to the risk of an oil spill in these pristine waters teeming with wildlife. In fact, there were some conditions spelled out prior to the license to operate the facility being awarded to Alyeska, the corporation in charge of the facility which was then co-owned by several oil companies; two of which included British Petroleum (BP) and Exxon. The players' names have changed in the intervening years but I can't recall who all were involved in 1989 other than these and probably Phillips and Arco. But don't quote me. At any rate, the chances for an oil spill were considered to be quite high given the weather, the currents, the Narrows, the ice coming off the nearby glaciers (which caused the Exxon Valdez to divert from the navigation lanes), etc. One of the conditions attached to the license was that Alyeska had to fund and staff an oil clean-up facility including barge, tugs, personnel, equipment, etc. suitable to clean up an oil spill within a given period of time. Of course, no ships of the size of the Exxon Valdez were using Port Valdez. But that didn't actually matter because Alyeska decided that since they had gone so many years without an oil spill it was unlikely they'd ever have one and they allowed the entire oil clean-up system to deteriorate to the point of not being ready to use. Or even available. As I recall, the barge itself was in the Seattle area in storage. That's handy. This turned out to be a critical problem because the first 3 days after the oil spell were days of calm weather and adequate clean-up equipment could have made a big difference in the amount of environmental damage done by the escaping crude oil. So there you have it. Those seven elements set the stage for the largest oil pollution disaster in Alaskan history. Who was to blame? Many people think that the Captain is always to blame but if that were the case then there would be no need to have licensed or even trained deck personnel. Captain Hazelwood, as we have seen, was not only justified in leaving a qualified third mate in charge of the bridge, he was required to leave the bridge to make his departure and loading report. The radar observers, who could have kept a watch (and do now) over all of Prince William Sound did not do so because no one told them they had to. The pilot, who surely could have made a difference, was either in the pilot station at the Narrows or on his way home in the pilot boat and, at any rate, not required to be aboard past his point of departure. Captain Hazelwood instructed his third mate that the ship was not in the traffic lanes (clearly shown on charts and on the CAS which shows the ship's own position) but diverting towards Bligh Reef to avoid pack ice that had overrun the transit lanes but that as soon as he was past the ice he was to turn the ship to get back into the lanes and then continue through Prince William Sound to Cape Hinchinbrook where, I have no doubt, Captain Hazelwood was to be called to the bridge as they departed the Sound. I'll leave the rest of the story for another article. *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List - Any opinions or suggestions expressed here are solely those of the writer(s). You must assume the entire responsibility for reliance upon them. All postings copyright the author. Submissions: PaddleWise_at_PaddleWise.net Subscriptions: PaddleWise-request_at_PaddleWise.net Website: http://www.paddlewise.net/ ***************************************************************************
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Thu Aug 21 2025 - 16:33:52 PDT