Re: [Paddlewise] Paddling Group Dynamics

Jackie and I have been communicating on the group dynamics issue.  She
has asked me to publicly post one of my messages to her.  My post (which
I have edited slightly) looks at the need for a rigorous analyitical,
facts based appproach to risk analysis.  As a preface, it clears up some
questions as to where John Winter's "Suicide Pact" trip took place and
who the paddlers were.  It then looks at the institutional development
of safe canoe tripping in Ontario, and the role the Man vs. Nature
approach has taken in hindering the development of safe canoe tripping
practices.  To provide concrete examples, it examines some trips in
detail (the St. John's Boys School disaster on Lake Temiskaming near the
mouth of the Kipawa, and more recently, different approaches to the
section of ocean between the mouth of the Harricanaw and the mouth of
the Moose at the southern tip of Hudson's Bay).  Finally, it contrasts
John's rigorous analytical, facts based approach to risk assessment
against the  Man vs. Nature approach and the trust in tradition
approach.


Hi Jackie:

Sorry about not filling in the full names and backgrounds in my post. 
Here is some background info which might help sort out who is who. 
Please forgive me if I put forward material with which you are already
familiar.

The trip we are discussing was made by George Luste, Tiija Luste, John
Winters and Bill Swift Jr.  They paddled between the northern tip of
Labrador and Baffin Island.  They started in Ungava Bay, entered
Hudson's Straight, rounded the Torngat Peninsula, and paddled down the
northen part of Labrador's Atlantic coast.  This is one of the roughest
areas of the North-West Passage, for it is where the winds of the long,
narrow Hudson's Straight collide with the storms of the North Atlantic. 
The shoreline is very rugged, for the cape is formed by the Torngat
Mountains, which is a rugged range north of the tree line.  In historic
times, a few first peoples have lived and paddled in the area, but
recently the region has been deserted.  To the best of my knowledge, no
one had ever successfully canoed the route which this party completed. 
The only other attempt of which I am aware was made by a George Luste
led team a couple of years previously.  He was stopped by ice and had to
portage across the mountain range.

George Luste was the trip coordinator for this attempt.  George is a
physics professor at the University of Toronto.  He runs Northern Books,
which is Canada's foremost antiquarian bookstore specializing in
northern, arctica, Canadiana, wilderness and canoeing topics (e.g first
editions of 19th century arctic explorer's journal publications).  He
has led the effort to limit logging in Missinaibi River Provincial Park,
which is a very popular canoe route.  He is a long time member of the
Wilderness Canoe Association and organizes its annual Wilderness
Symposium, which draws remote wilderness and arctic paddlers from
throughout the world.  He usually spends his summers paddling solo
throughout the arctic, and has paddled more miles in the arctic than
anyone else I have come across.  For example, his 1996 trip from
Yellowknife to Coppermine via Bathurst was about one-thousand miles and
began with a two-hundred and fifty mile drag across the rotten ice of
Great Slave Lake.  He is equally at home paddling on arctic rivers, on
expansive arctic lakes, or on the Arctic Ocean.

Tiija Luste is George's daughter and was his paddling partner on this
trip.  Although I have met her a few times, I do not know her
personally, so I am not up on her background.  I do know that she has
made several arctic expeditions, including an interior transection of
the Ungava Peninsula with her father.  She is a professional wilderness
canoeing guide with Algonquin Outfitters, the leading guide service for
Algonquin Park, which is one of Canada's more popular preserves.

John Winters is a high-end canoe and kayak designer who has retired from
a career as a naval architect.  His designs often take paddling to a new
level.  His Albany was used for this trip, and is an open ocean
expedition canoe which, from personal experience, I can say is in a
league of its own (BTW, George designed the cover for the Albany). 
John's designs are manufactured by Swift Canoe.  John has a great many
remote wilderness trips under is belt, has been certified as a
wilderness first aid instructor, and has taken many rescue courses. 
Prior to specializing in paddling, he was a highly accomplished
yachtsman.  He has been the primary paddling consultant in the planning
of Polar Bear Provincial Park, which is one of the world's larger arctic
preserves, and is active in contributing to the restriction of logging
in Algonquin Provincial Park.  He lives in a cabin in the woods and
paddles daily in the summer.  He is a long time member of the Wilderness
Canoe Association, and at one time was its president.

Bill Swift Jr., John's paddling partner, grew up in a canoe in Algonquin
Park, for his parents' business was Algonquin Outfitters.  His parents
are now reitred.  Bill's brother has taken over the outfitting and
guiding service, while Bill has started up a canoe factory.  He provides
exceptional service which is unmatched by anyone else in the industry. 
Most of his experience is in interior lakes, so this trip was a step up
for him.  His general feeling about the trip was that it was a
remarkable challenge and a wonderful experience, but that he would
prefer to stick closer to home.  He is a member of the Wilderness Canoe
Association, and along with John, has has made great inroads in bringing
efficient designs to the paddling public.

I have mentioned the Wilderness Canoe Association (WCA) several times in
this post.  It is a club which focuses on remote wilderness canoeing,
particularly arctic canoeing, and which publishes a quarterly newsletter
which includes trip reports of its members.  If you care to send me your
snail-mail address, I will photocopy some material from the newsletter
and ship it to you.  You might find it interesting.

Finally, in my post I mentioned the St. John Boys' School disaster as an
example of why one should consider when rescue is not feasible.  Back
about twenty or thirty years ago, there was a dramatic growth in canoe
tripping in Ontario.  Prior to this time, most paddling was done locally
(for example, kids would take a train up to Temagami or Algonquin, or
families would drive up to a cottage, and then paddle about lakes in
their area); regattas rather than extended trips were the norm. 
Increased interest in tripping and wild water led to the development of
several organizations, including the Wilderness Canoe Association (WCA)
and the Ontario Recreational Canoeing Association (ORCA).  It indirectly
led to the growth of adult paddling and outdoor schools, such as
Madawaska Kanu Camp (MKC)and Outward Bound.  It led to the promotion of
experiential education programs in children's camps and schools, such as
Camp Wanapitei and St. John's Boys School.

The change from paddling on calm populated lakes to making extended
wilderness trips meant that many of the previous safety conventions
became inadequate.  For example, the traditional Red Cross drill for
canoe rescues was to hold on to the boat and drown-proof until someone
came along to pull your boat up on to theirs, empty it, and then assist
you back into it.  This worked nicely for folks on calm lakes in warm
weather near other people, but was not particularly useful for
wilderness trips, where the wave conditions which caused the first flip
would prevent a canoe-over-canoe rescue, where fully laden boats would
also prevent a canoe-over-canoe rescue and on-board victim recovery, and
where nasty weather and cold water would make hypothermia a critical
problem.  Therefore, in many tripping scenarios, the appropriate
response would be to set out for shore, either with or without
assistance from another boat.  This was directly contrary to the
traditional bob and wait approach promoted by the Red Cross.  (Even
worse, the Red Cross had traditionally been opposed to wild water
paddling, so there were few ways for people interested in wild water
paddling to learn a basic skill set.  The norm was for folks in poorly
designed and constructed canoes to hurl themselves down rapids like
lemmings.)  Thus the there was no institutional safety and rescue
foundation for a burgeoning sport.  People took what they knew from
traditional cottage paddling, and tried to apply it to wilderness
trips.  The results were catastrophic.

One of the worst of many needless mishaps involved St. John's Boys
School.  This was a very well reputed British style residential school
which was a leader in Ontario in the new field of outdoor experiential
education.  It based its approach upon the Outward Bound model, which
had itself developed out the British SAS military approach -- very much
Man vs. Nature, conqour your fears, develop through adversity and the
like.  They planned a lengthy trip starting on Lake Temiskaming, which
is a large lake known for cold water and very sudden, nasty storms. 
They stayed up rather late celebrating their departure, drove through
the night to the put in, had some cold sandwiches for breakfast, and set
off paddling.  Their canoes were large, with one adult coxing each boat,
and several children paddling in each boat.  The boats were heavily
loaded, and the paddlers sat up upon their packs.  There were no spray
covers.  All the adults and most of the children had cottage canoeing
experience, but none had significant wilderness tripping experience. 
All were dressed for hiking, rather than cold, wet paddling, for
wetsuits were not yet used for paddling, and drysuits did not exist. 
None had formal training in wilderness safety and rescue, for no such
training was available in Ontario at the time.  They set out in windy
conditions and quickly ran into trouble.  One canoe flipped.  Rather
than swim to shore, the paddlers remained with their boat.  Another boat
went to the rescue, also flipped, and its paddlers also remained with
the boats.  The emergency continued to expand in this fashion.  The
result was that many of the children died.  (I forget the numbers --
quite a few.  If you are interested, Scotty Sorenson of the Kipawa River
Lodge--which was the morgue--can tell you about the disaster log which
the survivors wrote the next day.  It is very moving, particularly since
the paddlers' notes are annotated with Scotty's comments such as "lost
twin brother".)

As you can tell, they made just about every error in the book, but you
have to remember that at the time of the incident, there was no book
appropriate to wilderness trips.  The closest thing was traditional
cottage paddling practices and Red Cross safe boating guidelines.  (The
brother of one of my friends was on the trip, and several years after
the incident still thought that the trip leaders had acted
appropriately).  The notes written by the paddlers in Scotty's log did
not mention possible mitigations, but instead reflected upon the
disaster as if it were an act of god.  At the inquest, John Woods, of
the newly formed ORCA, helped address the underlying problems which led
to the disaster, so at least we can say that something was learned, but
the cost was too high.

Let's look at just one of the many errors that was made, and then apply
it to John's team's decision concerning rescue attempts.  The Boys
School trip leaders failed to recognize that if there was a spill, a
boat based rescue would not be feasible, would put the rescuers at
extreme risk, and would increase the death toll.  Had they recognized
this they either should have resolved to not attempt boat based rescues
in severe weather (essentially letting the swimmers fend for
themselves), or simply not set out from shore in the first place. 
Obviously the only reasonable solution was to not set out from shore. 
Given that the lake was known for sudden rough storms, they could not
have completed the trip without risking being caught in nastiness, so
not only should they have not set out from shore, but they should not
have attempted the trip in the first place.

Now let's compare this with John's Torngat trip.  John's team went
through a risk analysis, and came to the conclusion that because of the
frequent and lengthy severe conditions of the region in which they
wished to paddle, they would either have to risk paddling in conditions
which would preclude rescue, risk remaining on shore for such extended
periods that they would have to winter over (BTW, they all have winter
expedition experience), or simply not attempt the trip in the first
place.  Therefore, their risk analysis included the recognition that if
they intended to set out on the journey, they would have to be prepared
for the possibility, however slight, that they might encounter
circumstances in which a rescue might not be feasible.  What they did
not do, to their credit, was ignore the problem, or blindly fall back on
old adages such as "keep the group together", "stay with the boat" or
"always rescue your buddy".  Had they done so, they would have been as
negligent as the leaders of the Boys School.  When it comes to risk
analysis, making no decision is far worse than making a decision which
points to a nasty outcome.  The Boys School failed in not making a
decision, whereas John's team succeeded because they made a positive
decision.

Having performed their risk analysis and made their decision to proceed
with the trip in spite of the risk of possibly not being able to effect
rescues, John's team then attempted to mitigate the risk.  This is
probably all old hat to you, for it is no more than putting together a
strong combination of experience, training, equipment, and analysis. 
Concerning the non-rescue pact, this simply meant that instead of
pushing the boats to their limits, as is common for cottage paddlers,
John's team had to ensure that they always came in whenever the
conditions became severe enough to possibly flip one of their boats.  By
mitigating in this respect, John's team took less risk than many
conventional trippers, such as the Boys School.  Quite simply, John's
team recognized that they could not risk flipping, and acted
accordingly, wereas the Boys School did not address the question, and
therefore ran into truly horrid trouble.

Unfortunately, this reluctance to make rigorous risk analyses still
pervades the tripping scene.  At a trite level is the sponson issue,
where water wings have been promoted as a solution to poor boat design
and inadequate paddling skill.  For cottage paddlers, who do not go
through formal risk analyses, the sponsons may not necessarily be a bad
thing, but they are simply embuggerances for skilled canoeists in high
performance expedition boats who have taken the care to perform rigorous
risk analyses.  More seriously is the continuing reluctance of the
tripping crowd to wear helmets in moving water.  Most tippers have a
favorite hat (I suppose you might come across this sort of thing with
Texas cowboy hats), and consequently do not want to replace it with a
helmet, even though they significantly increase their risk by paddling
wild water or walking portages without wearing a helmet.  They will wear
a helmet when practising at local rapids, but will not wear one on
extended trips, even though they are closer to medical care at their
local rapids than when they are off in the bush.  There is no logic to
this.  It is simply tradition being chosen over risk analysis. 
Tradition dies hard, but also causes paddlers to die.

Most seriously is the still prevalent Man vs. Nature approach to
tripping.  This has led to folks who should know better (e.g.
experienced trip leaders with formal certification) doing some pretty
silly things.  For example, take my approach to the Kattawagami (
http://www.geocities.com/~culpeper/kattaw.html ) and compare it with
Wanapitei's approach.  (A Wanapitei group made the first run down the
river which included paddling out along the arctic ocean to the rail
head.  I made the second.  There have been four other groups which have
made the river run only but have not attempted the ocean, one of which
pulled out after a few days.)  Wanipitei was much more aggressive --
they ran more of the rapids, and paddled on the ocean in more serious
conditions.  I tended to hold back and think through the worst case
senario.  Essentially, while both trips were composed of skilled and
responsible paddlers, I had a much more thorough risk analysis.  (One of
the Wanipitei paddlers and I have kayaked some serious wild water
together over the years, so I am basing my statements on more than just
one trip.)  What was the result on the Kattawagami?  My partner and I
had a swell time, with one minor swim.  The Wanapitei group had several
minor swims and a couple of nasty swims, ran out of drinking water on
the ocean, and came very close to being swept out to sea.  The funny
thing is that due to all their mishaps, I ended up completing the trip
in less time.  Had they done a better job at their risk analyses, they
too could have had an uneventful trip.  My concern is that they were
looking for adventure, and let this blind them.

Finally, even for people who have progressed beyond the Man vs. Nature
approach, I still am troubled by some folk's reluctance to critically
evaluate the data at hand when performing their risk analyses.  Quite
simply, many folks tend to put too much faith in general paddling
wisdom, rather than take a cold hard look at the facts.  I call this the
trust in tradition approach.  Again, I would like to turn to my
Kattawagami example.  The ocean section (between the mouths of the Moose
and Harricanaw rivers at the base of Hudson's Bay) has such a nasty
reputation for severe waves that it is only very rarely paddled by human
powered craft.  Conventional tripping wisdom would have it that one
should stick close to shore if there is the possibility of rough water. 
However, if one looks closely at the facts, it becomes apparent that the
only way to navigate this section is to head well off from shore (over
five miles) where there are deep water chanels.  This reqires twelve
hour periods of relative calm, which in the late summer can be expected
for approximately three days of every five.  Therefore, to safely
navigate this section, one must be willing to wait out significant
periods of less than perfect weather, and then make aggressive leaps
well out from shore during the middle of good weather.  Wanipitei did
not follow this analysis, and instead stayed close to shore.  This
bogged them down in the shoals, and therefore toward the end of the day
when the wind changed (as one would expect it to), they found themselves
exposed.  It took them so long to get out of their predicament that they
ran out of light, and had to paddle in rising waves.  After several days
of this sort of nonsense, they approached the Moose Chanel, but were so
far off schedule that they missed the rising tide, and were swept out to
sea by the combined river current and ebbing tide.  They had to fight
some nasty waves for several hours until the tide turned and brought
them to safety.  (The fellow with whom I have kayaked says that when
they landed he crawled out of his boat and kissed the sand  -- I've seen
him make some class V wild water runs without doing this, so I gather
that the ocean section of their Kattawagami trip was quite harrowing.) 
They came close to buying the farm because they failed to look at the
facts and perform a rigorous risk analyses, and instead chose to follow
conventional paddling wisdom which was not appropriate to the
circumstances.

This is an area in which I find John to be a breath of fresh air, for
instead of setting himself up as an authority and spouting out
conventional wisdom (as did the authorities in canoeing safety prior to
the St. John School Boys disaster, and as a great many people still do
today), John asks that we should first look at the facts and see what
models the data will support.  Thus he thinks through the epercussions
of counting on making rescues in severe water.  He questions the
advances in safety equipment against individuals' willingness to assume
more risk when they feel proteted.  If the model supports the data, then
he accepts it.  If the model does not fit the data, then he tosses it
and looks for one which does.  His is not a contrarian who arbitrarily
tosses out convention wisdom.  He is not an authoritarian who
arbitrarily follows conventional wisdom.  He is simply a highly
experienced paddler who looks at the facts with a fresh face every time
he heads out.  He looks at the risks, looks at the mitigations, and
makes a conscious decision.  We need more like him.

Richard Culpeper, M.A.
www.geocities.com/~culpeper
(might as well put my cards on the table along with John and his
crowd's)
Instructor:  Ontario Wildwater Affiliation
Instructor:  Ontario Canoe Sprint Racing Affiliation
Past-director:  Wilderness Canoe Association, Canoe Ontario, Ontario
Recreational Canoeing Association, Sudbury Canoe Club

And yes, I'm a vegetarian.

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