Hello all, There have been some interesting discussions here about group dynamics in paddling. One situation I have wanted to discuss in more depth is one of John Winter's trips that was very briefly discussed on WaveLength where, because of Tim Ingram's uhmm... hysteria, there was no chance of delving further into the group dynamics and conducting an objective discussion in that forum. Some of you may remember Tim's continual reference to the trip as "John's suicide pact" (or something like that). Anyhow, I found that group's agreement and decision interesting and worthy of further exploration. Because Tim created an environment on WaveLength which rendered this topic so untouchable, I contacted John and asked if he had any objections to my reviving the discussion here on PaddleWise as part of an open discussion on group dynamics and he has graciously agreed to discuss that trip here. I'm sure I don't have all the facts but basically, as I *think* I understand it, the conditions were severe and each member in John's group agreed to paddle the conditions and not accept help from or come to the aid of any of the others in the group. I know this sounds simplistic but this is all I could gather from comments on WaveLength. In a sense, each paddler agreed that from the launch point, each paddler would be paddling alone. My first question would be why was it important to proceed with the paddle in spite of the adverse conditions. My second concern would be that even though I might understand the decision of a skilled paddler to paddle alone in adverse conditions realizing the risks and trusting their own skill level, I'm not sure I could be convinced that another paddler would stick to such an agreement if I ended up in trouble. I asked John if he might share his story here in this forum. I know he couldn't do that on WaveLength (though he tried) but I think it's probably safe here. Afterall, we *did* constructively cover the most controversial topic of sponsons here! :-) I think there are many different situations in group paddling that could present interesting, informative and educational discussions here that others have successfully solved while others of us have not quite yet figured the solutions and could benefit greatly from the experience and suggestions of others. Cheers, Jackie _ _ _ _ _ \\ / \0/ \ / \0/ \ \\ " " `\ ,sSSs,\, )\w/( ,sSS..)/{) <<..> sSSS_v)/ \ )<*> sSS[(\_]___\ <(_/_o_o_ 'sS[_`-+---+) \----+-------+-------'---`-----\-------------') ~~~~~~~ ~~jf ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~\~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ o \ o \\ o o \\ o o ` (\ o o >jf:-) o (/ o ----- End Included Message ----- *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
At 06:02 PM 25-02-98 -0800, you wrote: >...snipped... basically, as I *think* I >understand it, the conditions were severe and each member in John's group >agreed to paddle the conditions and not accept help from or come to the aid >of any of the others in the group. I know this sounds simplistic but this is >all I could gather from comments on WaveLength. In a sense, each paddler >agreed that from the launch point, each paddler would be paddling alone. My >first question would be why was it important to proceed with the paddle in >spite of the adverse conditions. My second concern would be that even though >I might understand the decision of a skilled paddler to paddle alone in >adverse conditions realizing the risks and trusting their own skill level, >I'm not sure I could be convinced that another paddler would stick to such an >agreement if I ended up in trouble. ...snipped... Interesting decision...although I don't think I could ever be comfortable agreeing to that, for several reasons. Part of it is coming from a background of things like boating, wildnerness camping and mountaineering, in which we understood that we would render aid when needed, even to strangers, and that it was everyone's responsibility to not only take care of themselves, but to take care of the others, should they get into trouble. Sometimes folks would get into trouble without realizing it was occuring...like gradually becoming hypothermic on a winter climb, for instance. Usually it was someone other than the victim who picked up on what was happening, and the group would take measures to reverse things early on (often against the "I'm ok" protests of the one becoming hypothermic). Then of course there was heat exhaustion, injuries, fatique, or sometimes simply paralyzing fear (I really hate dealing with that one, because you never really know what they'll do next). But from the seakayaking point of view, if you lump it in with boating in general, it is kind of the rule of the sea that you aid any boat in trouble, if it is possible to render aid without sinking your own vessel. If you can't render aid, then stand by, again if possible. Granted, these traditions come from offshore sailing history, but I think this universal comraderie, so to speak, is what one thing that makes boating special. It also underlies a knowledge that in any battle with the sea, the ocean wins...kind of maintains a healthy respect for the elements. I would hate to have kayaking go the way of so much of our world, with an "everyone for themselves, you're on your own" attitude. More importantly, if someone traveling in my group died because the rest of us couldn't be bothered to try saving them, I would probably never enjoy the sport again. Not because someone died, but because no one tried to stop it. If the conditions are so rough that you would be unable to assist another kayaker, and you have a choice of launching or not, is it really worth launching (kind of like would you climb a mountain in a blizzard)? If you're already out there and things get dicey...well, in the retrospectoscope, usually the situation could have been averted if we'd done our homework beforehand, or been paying attention while out there (which has never helped me in the middle of such a predicament). A lot of folks feel that independence is an extremely important thing, and that is true...but that changes in a group. I remember one very independent hiker who liked to let less expert hikers tag along, but would be concerned only with maintaining his schedule. He never saw when they were pushed too far, even when they said they needed to rest. By the time things got really bad, he would leave them behind to "go get help" and have these really dramatic sagas getting help...but sometimes the people he left behind died or had body parts amputated. As expert as his skills in backcountry were, I do not consider him a hero or even a save companion. So what does this have to do with kayaking? I see the same process rearing its ugly head here...it's harder to render aid on water than it is on land. Maybe because of that, it's more critical to do so. I would be interested to know how others approach this issue. Leander *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
Jackie Fenton wrote: --snip-- > My > first question would be why was it important to proceed with the > paddle in > spite of the adverse conditions. My second concern would be that even > though > I might understand the decision of a skilled paddler to paddle alone > in > adverse conditions realizing the risks and trusting their own skill > level, > I'm not sure I could be convinced that another paddler would stick to > such an > agreement if I ended up in trouble. --snip-- In reply to your second question, concerning the willingness of John's companions to hold to the agreement and not rescue him, I suggest that if you knew John, you would have not concerns on this matter. The last time he fell out of a boat some nearby fishermen rowed over to club him with their oars, and a concerned citizen on shore called up the Ministry of the Environment's spills hot-line. He finally made it to shore and flagged down a car, but the folks inside would not let him in. He has not been seen in public since, and has retreated to the internet. More seriously, and in response to your first question, at this level of paddling there are some pretty serious inherent risks. If one is not willing to take them, one should not start on the trip. The area John paddled through (one of the roughest parts of the North-West Passage) is known for prolonged severe weather, bergy bits, extended exposed coasts, and an extremely short paddling season (indeed, on a previous attempt, George had to portage through the Torngats because of ice). Would it be possible for John and his gang to complete their journey without paddling in rough water? I doubt it. They probably would not find enough calm days to complete their journey in one season. Why would someone chose to venture into such an area? One might as well ask why would someone paddle class V wild water, or climb an 8,000m mountain? The more specific question, why they would agree to not make rescue attempts, arises out of the performance characteristics of their canoes (Albanys with covers -- BTW, I paddle the same boat, and have used it in both open ocean and heavy wild water and find it quite remarkable). These boats are tremendously seaworthy. The hitch is that conditions severe enough to flip one of them would be severe enough to make rescue impossible. Therefore, knowing that these boats are capable of making way in water in which rescue is not feasible, it becomes important to know when to run for shore. The pact should not be interpreted as a willingness to let one's companions die, but rather a recognition that the boats must run for shore well before flipping becomes a significant possibility. I think that it is important to keep the issue in perspective. Most canoeists are relatively unskilled (in both technique and experience) and paddle low performance boats, so dumps are not uncommon, but because they quite reasonably keep to paddling in mild conditions, rescues are feasible -- thus canoe-over-canoe rescues are the norm for kids camps and recreational canoeing instruction. This simply does not apply to highly experienced paddlers in high performance expedition canoes in arctic waters. Rescue in a blow in Hudson's Straight is not comparable with rescue on a cottage country lake. I think that it would be unwise to confuse the one with the other. Similarly, I wish that when folks move into more serious waters, they would re-consider their rescue alternatives. (For example, the St. John's Boys School disaster could easily have been avoided if the tip leaders had thought through the rescue alternatives. A great tragedy resulted in part from their assuming that rescue was possible.) Finally, would they hold to the agreement? I expect that it would come down to the conditions at the time. If a rogue wave caught one of the boats, so that a rescue attempt was possible, I expect that the decision would be different than if general conditions had deteriorated to the point that a boat flipped. Therefore, I would not take their agreement as an absolute rule against rescues, but rather a realization that in some circumstances rescue is not feasible and should not be attempted. I do, however, take your point about people not necessarily holding to plan in the heat of the moment, for once I followed a swimmer down something nasty to fish him out even though we had agreed that he would be on his own if he messed up (we made it, but it took a day to find his boat). I suppose that I could fall out of my boat the next time I come across John, just to see if he will rescue me. But to be honest, knowing John and George, I seriously doubt if they would ever get in over their heads to such a point that they would have to take such drastic actions. I look at their pact as part of a responsible planning process which includes looking at a broad range of very remote possibilities. I applaud their foresight in looking at all the risks, and in recognizing that they had darn well better avoid some problems which once encountered have no viable solutions. Now here's the kicker. George and John have both spent a great deal of time in regions of the north where, how shall we put it politely, shortages of rations and inclement weather have led previous explorers make what genteel society would consider to be unacceptable food choices. Dare I say it, cannibalism. John, I would like to know if you had any discussions on this subject. More specifically, did you bring Bill on the trip to act as a self-propelled larder? Inquiring minds........ Richard Culpeper www.geocities.com/~culpeper *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
This is a provocative topic. The issue of whether to abandon your paddling partners, and what sorts of conditions or "arrangements" might make such abandonment "ethical" is one which will probably use up a LOT of bandwidth. Maybe it would be useful to distinguish between two kinds of sea kayaking: 1. "Hair" boating: trips or crossings in which the participants are on the edge of the possible, have already committed their souls to their Maker, and are beyond the dictates of we "normal" paddlers. 2. "Normal" boating: what most of us do. Trips with our buddies or maybe with a club group, not looking for an "ultimate challenge." Sometimes we get in over our heads (ooooh, an accidental pun), and all at once we get to apply our "ethics," without having thought about them ahead of time. Some leave; some do not ... I bet 99% of the readers of this list NEVER do any hair boating. (Those who do, please stand up!) So, perhaps, we should agree to accept a ground rule: What "ethics" are apropos of "normal" boating? I'd kind of like to know just what sorts of people and conditions are likely to lead to my abandonment (aside from having eaten ALL the Oreo cookies surreptitiously -- snarf! snarf!). -- Dave Kruger Astoria, OR sea kayaker -- and never a hairy one! *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
> This is a provocative topic. The issue of whether to abandon your > paddling partners, and what sorts of conditions or "arrangements" might > make such abandonment "ethical" is one which will probably use up a LOT > of bandwidth. To me, it seems that if you've agreed at the beginning to go as a group, then you've already made your choice. Whether you like it or not, other people in the group made their decision with the knowledge that you were to be part of that group. Your presence, or the presence of your additional boat may have altered the decision of someone else in the group. If you don't want to paddle with a group, a simple, "Hey, I'm off, maybe I'll see yall over at campsite X this evening, have a good one." And then put a half mile between you and the group. This is an honest approach. No one in the group will be assuming that you'll be around in case of trouble, nor will they feel obligated to paddle if the conditions are beyond their comfort zone. > Maybe it would be useful to distinguish between two kinds of sea > kayaking: > > 1. "Hair" boating: trips or crossings in which the participants are on > the edge of the possible, have already committed their souls to their > Maker, and are beyond the dictates of we "normal" paddlers. "Edge of the possible" Thats pretty extreme for sea kayaks, wouldn't you say? Maybe more useful: "paddling in conditions that would be likely to capsize an intermediate paddler at least once a day"... > I'd kind of like to know just what sorts of people and conditions are > likely to lead to my abandonment (aside from having eaten ALL the Oreo > cookies surreptitiously -- snarf! snarf!). Great thing about sea kayaking, a couple extra bag fulls stuffed in the hold, no problem. *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
John's idea of agreeing with every member that everyone is on their own, and that there would be no one around to rescue anyone is one of the best ideas I heard about for putting a group together. It is the perfect vaccine against the plague that infects many potential victims: risk homeostasis. By agreeing to be on their own, the members of the group would be extra cautious, address the conditions against their skills more seriously, and use better judgement. Now, once in the water everyone is human and would come to the rescue of someone in need, but the agreement also implied that a member is not going to run after another member to make sure that the first one is within line of sight; it is the resposibility of each member to stay close to the group, not the reverse. I think John's waiver also reflects his addressing of the risk homeostasis problem. The waiver says something like "Hey, assume I do not know anything about kayaking, if you are going to act like a fool because you know that I would be close enough to save you from trouble you are in the wrong trip". The first guys who climbed mount Everest without oxygen (Messner, and another mountaineer) agreed not to come to the rescue of the other during the climb. After they reached the top, Messner suffered blindness and the other guy had to take care of him during the descent. The agreement prevented them from making anything foolish (Messner is well known for pushing the limits beyond any level of risk). Leading a trip is another story. If you are a leader you take responsibility of the group, and the only think you can do to prevent risk homeostasis is make everyone sign a waiver where it is assured that no one will come alive from the trip. Maybe the leader should say "let me have your keys, may I keep your 4 wheel drive after you drown?". :-) Sometimes it necessary to act like an ---------(bad word) to prevent others from injuring themselves. By the way, this summer I am planning to circumnavigate the island of Menorca in the Mediterranean. My father wants me to carry a cellular phone, which I can understand. He does not expect me to get in trouble relying on the cell phone to cry for rescue, but it will just keep the family calm by knowing that they can do a status check anytime. Thank you John for pointing us to that risk homeostasis thing. - Julio *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
Jackie and I have been communicating on the group dynamics issue. She has asked me to publicly post one of my messages to her. My post (which I have edited slightly) looks at the need for a rigorous analyitical, facts based appproach to risk analysis. As a preface, it clears up some questions as to where John Winter's "Suicide Pact" trip took place and who the paddlers were. It then looks at the institutional development of safe canoe tripping in Ontario, and the role the Man vs. Nature approach has taken in hindering the development of safe canoe tripping practices. To provide concrete examples, it examines some trips in detail (the St. John's Boys School disaster on Lake Temiskaming near the mouth of the Kipawa, and more recently, different approaches to the section of ocean between the mouth of the Harricanaw and the mouth of the Moose at the southern tip of Hudson's Bay). Finally, it contrasts John's rigorous analytical, facts based approach to risk assessment against the Man vs. Nature approach and the trust in tradition approach. Hi Jackie: Sorry about not filling in the full names and backgrounds in my post. Here is some background info which might help sort out who is who. Please forgive me if I put forward material with which you are already familiar. The trip we are discussing was made by George Luste, Tiija Luste, John Winters and Bill Swift Jr. They paddled between the northern tip of Labrador and Baffin Island. They started in Ungava Bay, entered Hudson's Straight, rounded the Torngat Peninsula, and paddled down the northen part of Labrador's Atlantic coast. This is one of the roughest areas of the North-West Passage, for it is where the winds of the long, narrow Hudson's Straight collide with the storms of the North Atlantic. The shoreline is very rugged, for the cape is formed by the Torngat Mountains, which is a rugged range north of the tree line. In historic times, a few first peoples have lived and paddled in the area, but recently the region has been deserted. To the best of my knowledge, no one had ever successfully canoed the route which this party completed. The only other attempt of which I am aware was made by a George Luste led team a couple of years previously. He was stopped by ice and had to portage across the mountain range. George Luste was the trip coordinator for this attempt. George is a physics professor at the University of Toronto. He runs Northern Books, which is Canada's foremost antiquarian bookstore specializing in northern, arctica, Canadiana, wilderness and canoeing topics (e.g first editions of 19th century arctic explorer's journal publications). He has led the effort to limit logging in Missinaibi River Provincial Park, which is a very popular canoe route. He is a long time member of the Wilderness Canoe Association and organizes its annual Wilderness Symposium, which draws remote wilderness and arctic paddlers from throughout the world. He usually spends his summers paddling solo throughout the arctic, and has paddled more miles in the arctic than anyone else I have come across. For example, his 1996 trip from Yellowknife to Coppermine via Bathurst was about one-thousand miles and began with a two-hundred and fifty mile drag across the rotten ice of Great Slave Lake. He is equally at home paddling on arctic rivers, on expansive arctic lakes, or on the Arctic Ocean. Tiija Luste is George's daughter and was his paddling partner on this trip. Although I have met her a few times, I do not know her personally, so I am not up on her background. I do know that she has made several arctic expeditions, including an interior transection of the Ungava Peninsula with her father. She is a professional wilderness canoeing guide with Algonquin Outfitters, the leading guide service for Algonquin Park, which is one of Canada's more popular preserves. John Winters is a high-end canoe and kayak designer who has retired from a career as a naval architect. His designs often take paddling to a new level. His Albany was used for this trip, and is an open ocean expedition canoe which, from personal experience, I can say is in a league of its own (BTW, George designed the cover for the Albany). John's designs are manufactured by Swift Canoe. John has a great many remote wilderness trips under is belt, has been certified as a wilderness first aid instructor, and has taken many rescue courses. Prior to specializing in paddling, he was a highly accomplished yachtsman. He has been the primary paddling consultant in the planning of Polar Bear Provincial Park, which is one of the world's larger arctic preserves, and is active in contributing to the restriction of logging in Algonquin Provincial Park. He lives in a cabin in the woods and paddles daily in the summer. He is a long time member of the Wilderness Canoe Association, and at one time was its president. Bill Swift Jr., John's paddling partner, grew up in a canoe in Algonquin Park, for his parents' business was Algonquin Outfitters. His parents are now reitred. Bill's brother has taken over the outfitting and guiding service, while Bill has started up a canoe factory. He provides exceptional service which is unmatched by anyone else in the industry. Most of his experience is in interior lakes, so this trip was a step up for him. His general feeling about the trip was that it was a remarkable challenge and a wonderful experience, but that he would prefer to stick closer to home. He is a member of the Wilderness Canoe Association, and along with John, has has made great inroads in bringing efficient designs to the paddling public. I have mentioned the Wilderness Canoe Association (WCA) several times in this post. It is a club which focuses on remote wilderness canoeing, particularly arctic canoeing, and which publishes a quarterly newsletter which includes trip reports of its members. If you care to send me your snail-mail address, I will photocopy some material from the newsletter and ship it to you. You might find it interesting. Finally, in my post I mentioned the St. John Boys' School disaster as an example of why one should consider when rescue is not feasible. Back about twenty or thirty years ago, there was a dramatic growth in canoe tripping in Ontario. Prior to this time, most paddling was done locally (for example, kids would take a train up to Temagami or Algonquin, or families would drive up to a cottage, and then paddle about lakes in their area); regattas rather than extended trips were the norm. Increased interest in tripping and wild water led to the development of several organizations, including the Wilderness Canoe Association (WCA) and the Ontario Recreational Canoeing Association (ORCA). It indirectly led to the growth of adult paddling and outdoor schools, such as Madawaska Kanu Camp (MKC)and Outward Bound. It led to the promotion of experiential education programs in children's camps and schools, such as Camp Wanapitei and St. John's Boys School. The change from paddling on calm populated lakes to making extended wilderness trips meant that many of the previous safety conventions became inadequate. For example, the traditional Red Cross drill for canoe rescues was to hold on to the boat and drown-proof until someone came along to pull your boat up on to theirs, empty it, and then assist you back into it. This worked nicely for folks on calm lakes in warm weather near other people, but was not particularly useful for wilderness trips, where the wave conditions which caused the first flip would prevent a canoe-over-canoe rescue, where fully laden boats would also prevent a canoe-over-canoe rescue and on-board victim recovery, and where nasty weather and cold water would make hypothermia a critical problem. Therefore, in many tripping scenarios, the appropriate response would be to set out for shore, either with or without assistance from another boat. This was directly contrary to the traditional bob and wait approach promoted by the Red Cross. (Even worse, the Red Cross had traditionally been opposed to wild water paddling, so there were few ways for people interested in wild water paddling to learn a basic skill set. The norm was for folks in poorly designed and constructed canoes to hurl themselves down rapids like lemmings.) Thus the there was no institutional safety and rescue foundation for a burgeoning sport. People took what they knew from traditional cottage paddling, and tried to apply it to wilderness trips. The results were catastrophic. One of the worst of many needless mishaps involved St. John's Boys School. This was a very well reputed British style residential school which was a leader in Ontario in the new field of outdoor experiential education. It based its approach upon the Outward Bound model, which had itself developed out the British SAS military approach -- very much Man vs. Nature, conqour your fears, develop through adversity and the like. They planned a lengthy trip starting on Lake Temiskaming, which is a large lake known for cold water and very sudden, nasty storms. They stayed up rather late celebrating their departure, drove through the night to the put in, had some cold sandwiches for breakfast, and set off paddling. Their canoes were large, with one adult coxing each boat, and several children paddling in each boat. The boats were heavily loaded, and the paddlers sat up upon their packs. There were no spray covers. All the adults and most of the children had cottage canoeing experience, but none had significant wilderness tripping experience. All were dressed for hiking, rather than cold, wet paddling, for wetsuits were not yet used for paddling, and drysuits did not exist. None had formal training in wilderness safety and rescue, for no such training was available in Ontario at the time. They set out in windy conditions and quickly ran into trouble. One canoe flipped. Rather than swim to shore, the paddlers remained with their boat. Another boat went to the rescue, also flipped, and its paddlers also remained with the boats. The emergency continued to expand in this fashion. The result was that many of the children died. (I forget the numbers -- quite a few. If you are interested, Scotty Sorenson of the Kipawa River Lodge--which was the morgue--can tell you about the disaster log which the survivors wrote the next day. It is very moving, particularly since the paddlers' notes are annotated with Scotty's comments such as "lost twin brother".) As you can tell, they made just about every error in the book, but you have to remember that at the time of the incident, there was no book appropriate to wilderness trips. The closest thing was traditional cottage paddling practices and Red Cross safe boating guidelines. (The brother of one of my friends was on the trip, and several years after the incident still thought that the trip leaders had acted appropriately). The notes written by the paddlers in Scotty's log did not mention possible mitigations, but instead reflected upon the disaster as if it were an act of god. At the inquest, John Woods, of the newly formed ORCA, helped address the underlying problems which led to the disaster, so at least we can say that something was learned, but the cost was too high. Let's look at just one of the many errors that was made, and then apply it to John's team's decision concerning rescue attempts. The Boys School trip leaders failed to recognize that if there was a spill, a boat based rescue would not be feasible, would put the rescuers at extreme risk, and would increase the death toll. Had they recognized this they either should have resolved to not attempt boat based rescues in severe weather (essentially letting the swimmers fend for themselves), or simply not set out from shore in the first place. Obviously the only reasonable solution was to not set out from shore. Given that the lake was known for sudden rough storms, they could not have completed the trip without risking being caught in nastiness, so not only should they have not set out from shore, but they should not have attempted the trip in the first place. Now let's compare this with John's Torngat trip. John's team went through a risk analysis, and came to the conclusion that because of the frequent and lengthy severe conditions of the region in which they wished to paddle, they would either have to risk paddling in conditions which would preclude rescue, risk remaining on shore for such extended periods that they would have to winter over (BTW, they all have winter expedition experience), or simply not attempt the trip in the first place. Therefore, their risk analysis included the recognition that if they intended to set out on the journey, they would have to be prepared for the possibility, however slight, that they might encounter circumstances in which a rescue might not be feasible. What they did not do, to their credit, was ignore the problem, or blindly fall back on old adages such as "keep the group together", "stay with the boat" or "always rescue your buddy". Had they done so, they would have been as negligent as the leaders of the Boys School. When it comes to risk analysis, making no decision is far worse than making a decision which points to a nasty outcome. The Boys School failed in not making a decision, whereas John's team succeeded because they made a positive decision. Having performed their risk analysis and made their decision to proceed with the trip in spite of the risk of possibly not being able to effect rescues, John's team then attempted to mitigate the risk. This is probably all old hat to you, for it is no more than putting together a strong combination of experience, training, equipment, and analysis. Concerning the non-rescue pact, this simply meant that instead of pushing the boats to their limits, as is common for cottage paddlers, John's team had to ensure that they always came in whenever the conditions became severe enough to possibly flip one of their boats. By mitigating in this respect, John's team took less risk than many conventional trippers, such as the Boys School. Quite simply, John's team recognized that they could not risk flipping, and acted accordingly, wereas the Boys School did not address the question, and therefore ran into truly horrid trouble. Unfortunately, this reluctance to make rigorous risk analyses still pervades the tripping scene. At a trite level is the sponson issue, where water wings have been promoted as a solution to poor boat design and inadequate paddling skill. For cottage paddlers, who do not go through formal risk analyses, the sponsons may not necessarily be a bad thing, but they are simply embuggerances for skilled canoeists in high performance expedition boats who have taken the care to perform rigorous risk analyses. More seriously is the continuing reluctance of the tripping crowd to wear helmets in moving water. Most tippers have a favorite hat (I suppose you might come across this sort of thing with Texas cowboy hats), and consequently do not want to replace it with a helmet, even though they significantly increase their risk by paddling wild water or walking portages without wearing a helmet. They will wear a helmet when practising at local rapids, but will not wear one on extended trips, even though they are closer to medical care at their local rapids than when they are off in the bush. There is no logic to this. It is simply tradition being chosen over risk analysis. Tradition dies hard, but also causes paddlers to die. Most seriously is the still prevalent Man vs. Nature approach to tripping. This has led to folks who should know better (e.g. experienced trip leaders with formal certification) doing some pretty silly things. For example, take my approach to the Kattawagami ( http://www.geocities.com/~culpeper/kattaw.html ) and compare it with Wanapitei's approach. (A Wanapitei group made the first run down the river which included paddling out along the arctic ocean to the rail head. I made the second. There have been four other groups which have made the river run only but have not attempted the ocean, one of which pulled out after a few days.) Wanipitei was much more aggressive -- they ran more of the rapids, and paddled on the ocean in more serious conditions. I tended to hold back and think through the worst case senario. Essentially, while both trips were composed of skilled and responsible paddlers, I had a much more thorough risk analysis. (One of the Wanipitei paddlers and I have kayaked some serious wild water together over the years, so I am basing my statements on more than just one trip.) What was the result on the Kattawagami? My partner and I had a swell time, with one minor swim. The Wanapitei group had several minor swims and a couple of nasty swims, ran out of drinking water on the ocean, and came very close to being swept out to sea. The funny thing is that due to all their mishaps, I ended up completing the trip in less time. Had they done a better job at their risk analyses, they too could have had an uneventful trip. My concern is that they were looking for adventure, and let this blind them. Finally, even for people who have progressed beyond the Man vs. Nature approach, I still am troubled by some folk's reluctance to critically evaluate the data at hand when performing their risk analyses. Quite simply, many folks tend to put too much faith in general paddling wisdom, rather than take a cold hard look at the facts. I call this the trust in tradition approach. Again, I would like to turn to my Kattawagami example. The ocean section (between the mouths of the Moose and Harricanaw rivers at the base of Hudson's Bay) has such a nasty reputation for severe waves that it is only very rarely paddled by human powered craft. Conventional tripping wisdom would have it that one should stick close to shore if there is the possibility of rough water. However, if one looks closely at the facts, it becomes apparent that the only way to navigate this section is to head well off from shore (over five miles) where there are deep water chanels. This reqires twelve hour periods of relative calm, which in the late summer can be expected for approximately three days of every five. Therefore, to safely navigate this section, one must be willing to wait out significant periods of less than perfect weather, and then make aggressive leaps well out from shore during the middle of good weather. Wanipitei did not follow this analysis, and instead stayed close to shore. This bogged them down in the shoals, and therefore toward the end of the day when the wind changed (as one would expect it to), they found themselves exposed. It took them so long to get out of their predicament that they ran out of light, and had to paddle in rising waves. After several days of this sort of nonsense, they approached the Moose Chanel, but were so far off schedule that they missed the rising tide, and were swept out to sea by the combined river current and ebbing tide. They had to fight some nasty waves for several hours until the tide turned and brought them to safety. (The fellow with whom I have kayaked says that when they landed he crawled out of his boat and kissed the sand -- I've seen him make some class V wild water runs without doing this, so I gather that the ocean section of their Kattawagami trip was quite harrowing.) They came close to buying the farm because they failed to look at the facts and perform a rigorous risk analyses, and instead chose to follow conventional paddling wisdom which was not appropriate to the circumstances. This is an area in which I find John to be a breath of fresh air, for instead of setting himself up as an authority and spouting out conventional wisdom (as did the authorities in canoeing safety prior to the St. John School Boys disaster, and as a great many people still do today), John asks that we should first look at the facts and see what models the data will support. Thus he thinks through the epercussions of counting on making rescues in severe water. He questions the advances in safety equipment against individuals' willingness to assume more risk when they feel proteted. If the model supports the data, then he accepts it. If the model does not fit the data, then he tosses it and looks for one which does. His is not a contrarian who arbitrarily tosses out convention wisdom. He is not an authoritarian who arbitrarily follows conventional wisdom. He is simply a highly experienced paddler who looks at the facts with a fresh face every time he heads out. He looks at the risks, looks at the mitigations, and makes a conscious decision. We need more like him. Richard Culpeper, M.A. www.geocities.com/~culpeper (might as well put my cards on the table along with John and his crowd's) Instructor: Ontario Wildwater Affiliation Instructor: Ontario Canoe Sprint Racing Affiliation Past-director: Wilderness Canoe Association, Canoe Ontario, Ontario Recreational Canoeing Association, Sudbury Canoe Club And yes, I'm a vegetarian. *************************************************************************** PaddleWise Paddling Mailing List Submissions: paddlewise_at_lists.intelenet.net Subscriptions: paddlewise-request_at_lists.intelenet.net Website: http://www.gasp-seakayak.net/paddlewise/ ***************************************************************************
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