[Paddlewise] Lake Michigan Account

I had a pleasant conversation with Mike Agostinelli regarding his 50 mile 
attempted crossing of Lake Michigan with friend, Paul Redzinski in the fall 
of 2006. More than willing to answer my questions and those garnered from 
Paddlewise, Mike was gracious and freely provided his answers. I felt 
compelled to interview one of the paddlers, given we were discussing their 
failed crossing and subsequent rescue without any consultation and therefore 
some of our comments may or may not have been unfair, though we did correct 
the buoy data information. I feel Mike established full consent for me to 
provide details as I saw fit. I keep these records for my own incident 
collective, regardless.



Here's the original story for reference:



http://www.chicagomag.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=8642F5EFCEA14A939100AB7214F31861&nm=Archives&type=PubPagi&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle+Title&mid=61BFC65300D24DB58350C761094153A1&tier=4&id=2877A76E2DE44877BC72636F4D779EE7





I've rearranged Mike's answers to correspond somewhat to the real-time 
events in the article (my questions were limited and out of order). 
Substantive wording is as close to the actual interview as I can make it, 
with some expansion where clearly implied.



Mike is getting into fitness paddling/racing and ordered a new Epic 18X, 
which took some time to arrive and had a few kinks still to iron out.  His 
previous kayak, a new model Epic Endurance, had the much improved cam-over 
tightening straps and high grade marine gaskets. He unfortunately split the 
seams, four feet each side of the cockpit, in breaking surf on Lake Michigan 
prior to the crossing and prior to his Epic 18X being fully ready. His 
Endurance had been fixed, returned, had further problems and was fixed once 
again -- but there were still kinks to work out. With neither boat 
operational for the crossing, Mike borrowed his friend Peg's older model 
Endurance.



I don't know how old, or if the borrowed Endurance was one of the South 
African or Chinese made production runs. Using an older, untested kayak does 
factor into the story, but not these production-run issues as the borrowed 
kayak wasn't a current itineration. I've interviewed paddlers with 
significant leaking issues who later discovered the gaskets simply needed 
replacing - a normal maintenance consideration. I didn't push for any other 
answers on this matter, nor if there were post-incident tests done, etc. 
The borrowed Endurance did have a high-tech rudder system, which Mike felt 
necessary for the crossing, as the article stated. The borrowed kayak had an 
older style of tightening straps, not the cam-over design.



The forecast had varied up and down, but on the morning of the paddle the 
predicted waves were in the four to six foot range. I didn't ask if this was 
the near-shore forecast for 5 miles out or for deeper waters offshore. I am 
unfamiliar with the forecasting methods employed by paddlers for southern 
Lake Michigan. Regardless, both men felt the four to six foot maximum wave 
height wouldn't be a big deal, considering the paddle was only 14 hours and 
the winds wouldn't swing and pick up until later in the day. They felt they 
could handle those conditions.



The men rolled at the half way point around noon for fun. Paul complained 
that water had entered his Kokatat drysuit. He had it in for repairs a 
couple of months prior to the trip, and had tested afterward. Mike doesn't 
know why the water entered Paul's drysuit. The two men did not discuss the 
issue again. I assume that this wasn't a significant factor in the stories 
outcome.



Paul's shoulder was hurting by this point. He had a spare paddle and his new 
bigger bladed wing paddle. Mike had the smaller mid-wing paddle. Apparently, 
the two traded paddles a few times I believe Mike said. He also indicated 
that Paul was quickly eating up Mike's Ibuprofen. After the mid-point roll, 
the wind started to shift, south to west to north, and so on. At the time, 
Mike did not know the Endurance was sluggish due to water in the rear 
compartment. Mike felt the bigger wing paddle of Paul's might give him an 
advantage over what was becoming an unresponsive vessel. The issue of wing 
paddles is somewhat mute, as it wasn't a contributing factor in this 
incident; therefore I did not press Mike for when and where the paddle 
trading occurred, re-occurred, or if Paul pressed his spare paddle into use.



As the leak filled the rear compartment more and more, the shifting winds 
picked up from 5 - 10 knots to a full 15 out of the north-northwest, then 
eventually to 20. Seas were soon running at six feet, with bigger waves 
occasionally. While Mike didn't like the bigger wing paddle, he realized 
something else was wrong. From the article it appears a big wave flooded the 
open hatch further while Paul was inspecting it. Mike says he lost some 
gear, as well as one of the spare float bags at some point. Paul tried the 
other float bag, both fully inflated and partially deflated to try and 
displace the water that had now really filled the compartment.



I assume from what Mike said to me that it was too difficult and frustrating 
for Paul to push the float bag in the flooded compartment and Paul gave up 
that tactic. Mike put it in Paul's front hatch and "kind of forgot about it 
(the float bag -DL)." Mike didn't seem to know why neither of them thought 
about the float bag further. I'm assuming they wanted to get on with the 
T-rescue and didn't want to goof around with the risk having the rear hatch 
fill again while playing with the float bag. The sea state was getting ugly. 
(Mike was on his cell phone when I called him, and I on long-distance 
charges; therefore I moved through these questions quickly).



Mike did indicate that the cockpit took on water, he assumes, from a 
combination of the rear of the kayak wallowing so deeply in the lake water 
and waves, combined with his Gore-Tex spray deck not fully repelling water 
from entering that way. He said in retrospect, that the spray skirt he used 
wasn't the one he should have taken for the crossing.



Mike eventually wet-exited from his kayak and stabilized Paul's P&H Quest so 
Paul could perform a T-rescue. This went slow but well with most of the 
water evacuated. What water remained was removed with a bilge pump by Paul, 
although this was very difficult for Paul to execute given the problems of 
trying to hold the hatch ajar while he pumped. Paul put the rear hatch back 
on, tightening the straps. Mike feels there could have been an issue with 
either the older hatch tightening system or possibly the hatch cover was 
asymmetrical and may have been oriented in the wrong manner, either at the 
put-in or subsequently by Paul. Nevertheless, Mike was happy to get underway 
again assuming the problem was over.



Mike figures it was about 20 minutes before the rear hatch was significantly 
flooded again. Seas were peaking close to 8 feet and still building. The 
previous fetch-limited deep-water wind waves were now superimposed upon with 
a building north wind, one they had expected, but not to the same degree. I'm 
assuming the already agitated sea state gave the wind better frictional 
engagement, building seas rapidly and adding to the rougher sea state. I've 
seen this on a few open water crossing after a wind shift where there was 
sufficient fetch and a land mass funneling effect. After another two 
T-rescues during the course of their journey, they continued on to a 
different, more southerly course. During the "ugly" last 1/3 of the trip, 
Mike states winds gusted well above 20 knots. Mike said some gusts hit 35 
knots eventually closer to the trip's end.



A nine foot breaking wave finally forced Mike over in his 
difficult-to-control, flooding kayak. I asked him candidly about wave height 
observations. He was concerned that paddlers appreciate his sense of scale. 
He does a lot of carpentry and home renovations, and has worked with ladders 
as a fireman for 20 years -- so has excellent awareness of height 
estimations.  He understands that waves always look bigger from the kayaker's 
low perspective. He stated that there were waves well in excess of nine feet 
at times, some up to 15 feet. More importantly, these waves were steep and 
breaking. He felt that although Paul was having difficulty with his shoulder 
and directional stability with the Quest in the difficult conditions, Paul 
was still calm, collected and in control, as was Mike despite the problems, 
and both would have finished the trip if the leaking problems had not 
occurred or continued to progress without resolve.



Mike didn't follow marine distress protocol when he finally decided to call 
in; he neither issued a Mayday or Pan Pan as he didn't feel they were 
scared, rather remaingl calm and still confident, though Mike does admit he 
was getting hypothermic in the water at the end and perhaps should have used 
a more formal appraoch. He simply wanted to contact the Coast Guard and 
establish communication. Both he and Paul knew Mike was cold, getting 
exhausted, and the boat would likely keep leaking. Mike was annoyed that the 
police marine unit thought at first that a prank call was being perpetrated, 
though Mike admits this may have happened partially because Mike sounded so 
in control and partly because at first they couldn't give any visuals, then 
later Paul blurted out he could. When Mike offered their GPS coordinates, 
the radio operator didn't bother to acknowledge the need for them to be 
relayed. If they had lost communication, that might have been an important 
detail.



The Chicago CG station shares a building with the police in the boating 
season, but vacates in the off-season, leaving the police marine unit 
monitoring local channels. Mike wasn't sure why the repeater didn't get 
their signal through to the CG at the other two manned stations further 
north and near the Illinois boarder, respectively, or if their message was 
simply missed. I asked Mike if his VHF had a HIGH/LOW switch. He didn't 
think so. I assume he was broadcasting at 5 watts.



Mike and Paul met with fellow paddlers subsequent to the failed crossing for 
a debriefing session. Ideas and suggestions were exchanged, including the 
need to ensure redundant floatation before leaving shore and carrying 
something like Denso tape (could have sealed the hatch). He said lessons 
were learned and he has no regrets.



I'd only add that Chicago is the "Windy City" for a reason. The term "Lake 
Effects" usually refers to a condition that dramatically loads moving air 
with moisture causing intense snowfall downwind. Perhaps kayakers in 
southern Lake Michigan can now add unanticipated wave heights to broaden the 
definition of lake effects. I've often done crossings at what I anticipated 
to be consistent with the forecasted values in terms of my comfort level, 
only to have seas build bigger than anticipated or undergo some local effect 
not anticipated. Either your boat, body, or gear must be absolutely beyond 
reproach if thing do deteriorate or you need to leave a wider margin for 
error. Or perhaps both. It is always easy to say this in hind sight.



Doug Lloyd

Victoria BC
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